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REPLY TO MACHOCK'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES
In Fink's Petition for Permission to Appeal, he raised a single issue:
Issue: Is the three-month statutory limitation period o f
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2000), satisfied by the filing
of a breach of contract complaint before the foreclosure
sale and where notice of the sale and the claimed
deficiency is afterward given to defendant through means
other than the filing of a complaint?
It is on this issue that the Supreme Court granted the petition for interlocutory appeal.
Machock attempts to recharacterize the issues on appeal in his "Statement of Issues."
Though Machock's issues are, perhaps, another way of asking the s a m e question as
Fink, the Court should consider only the single issue framed by Fink in his petition.1
REPLY TO MACHOCK'S STATEMENT OF F A C T S
In his summary judgment motion, Fink complied with Rule 4-501(2)(A), Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration, by providing a separate statement identifying in the
record each fact supporting Fink's motion. (R. 199-202.) To survive summary
judgment, Rule 4-501(2)(B) required Machock to produce evidence showing a fact in
dispute. Rule 4-501(2)(B) provides that the facts raised by Fink "shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
[Machock]." Id. (emphasis added).2 Machock's response to Fink's statement of facts
is found in the Record at R. 436-41.
1

Machock's Issue No. 1 is inaccurate. As shown below in Point LB. n.4, the
trial court did not conclude that "Machock's Complaint states a v a l i d cause of action
against Fink for breach of contract for payment on an absolute Guarantee."
This Rule has been replaced by Rule 7(c)(3)(A), Utah R u l e s of Civil
Procedure (effective November 1, 2003).
1

Fink's statement of facts, and Machock's response, constitute the universe of
facts considered by the trial court and it is the factual universe that this Court reviews.
This Court should not consider facts raised for the first time on appeal. Smith v. Four
Corners Mental Health Or.. Inc., 2003 UT 23,ffi|40-41, 70 P.3d 904; Lovendahl v.
Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130,fflf50-52, 63 P.3d 705; Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT
App 291, t1f 7-9, 77 P.3d 339. The following are "facts" that Machock offers for the
first time on appeal:
•

In Machock's Brief, at 7, 8-10, 31, and 33-34, he cites t o the parties'

discovery requests and responses. He admits that these were "not filed with the trial
court" (Brief of the Appellee ("Machock's Brief), at 7, t 8, & 8, % 12), but he
attaches them to his appellate brief anyway. Machock never mentioned these
documents in opposition to Fink's motion (R. 436-41) or in oral argument. They
should not be considered on appeal.
•

In Machock's Brief, at 14, he claims that "Fink was informed of the

trustee's sale, but did not bid at the sale. R. at 498." This contention is not based on
any evidence that was before the trial court. In Machock's opposition to Fink's
summary judgment motion, at 7, ^[ 1 (R. 441), he claimed that notice had been given,
but he did not offer any evidence to support this claim. Specifically, Machock
pointed to a letter dated April 18, 2000, but this was written after the foreclosure sale
- it was not notice. (R. 441 & 463-64.) Machock also referred to a letter dated
October 4, 1999, but this letter only states that Machock has instructed his attorney to

2

commence foreclosure proceedings - it does not give notice of the t i m e or place for a
sale. (R. 465-66.)
•

In Machock's Brief, at 3, he claims: "The bank's successor

subsequently foreclosed on the property and was also the successful bidder. R. at
531, Tr. at 24." Similarly, in Machock's brief at 15, he claims: "Shortly after the
April 18, 2000 letter, the holder of the first deed of trust [Brighton B a n k ] foreclosed
on the Harmer property. R. at 531, Tr. at pp. 24-25." This is a bald assertion made by
Machock's counsel at oral argument that was never supported as factual in the record
below. (R. 436-41). As Machock points out elsewhere in his brief, "argument from
counsel... is not evidence." (Machock's Brief, at 24 n.5.)
None of these facts were in the record before the trial court. T h i s Court should
not consider them. Even if this Court were to accept these facts as t r u e , however, and
consider them in this appeal, they do not aid Machock's position on the substantive
issue presented here.
ARGUMENT
I.

MACHOCK'S BREACH OF CONTRACT
CLAIM IS BARRED.
A.

Machock Elected Not to Pursue a
Deficiency Claim.

At all times, Machock has sought to recover the full value o f the note and
guaranty on a breach of contract claim. (See, e.g., Machock's Complaintfflj4-13 &
Prayer, (R. 1-3)). Machock has never elected to pursue a section 5 7-1-32 deficiency
claim. At oral argument on Fink's summary judgment motion, Machock's counsel
3

plainly stated that this lawsuit was not a deficiency action under Section 57-1-32.
(Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing on March 6, 2003 ("Tr."), R. 531, Tr.
page 22, lines 20-25; R. 502 (Ruling at 7)). When the trial court inquired whether it
was appropriate to seek a windfall by pursuing a breach of contract claim instead of a
deficiency, Machock's counsel said it was. (R. 531, Tr. page 27, lines 5-14); R. 501
(Ruling at 6) ("In the hearing scheduled March 6, 2003, Machock, through counsel,
argued that it would be entirely appropriate to foreclose on the property owned by
Harmer . . . and also collect the entire $150,000 from Fink.")). When the trial court
asked whether a section 57-1-32 deficiency is "something that your client is not even
asking for," Machock's counsel said it was not. (R. 531, Tr. page 28, lines 4-15.)
In Machock's appellate brief, he continues to argue that he has the right to sue
for contract damages independent of section 57-1-32. For example, h e argues:
"Machock's breach of contract claim is based on the absolute Guarantee and is
therefore independent of any deficiency claim." (Machock's Brief, at 18.) Machock
asserts further: "Fink's liability to Machock pursuant to the absolute Guarantee was
In Machock's Brief, at 25, footnote 5, he incorrectly says that his counsel
"acknowledged that Machock would be preclude from obtaining a double recovery on
his breach of contract claim. R. at 531, Tr. p. 27." This mischaracterizes the
discussion between the trial court and Machock's counsel at oral argument. On this
page of the transcript Machock's counsel argues that Machock can have both the
foreclosed property and payment in full on the note. R. 531, Tr. page 27, lines 5-14.
This is the windfall that is prohibited by section 57-1-32. Further down the page, at
lines 23 through 25, and continuing on the following page, lines 1 through 3,
Machock's counsel says that he will give Fink a credit for any money paid by Harmer.
This is a different kind of "double recovery" from the windfall that Machock seeks by
foreclosing and pursuing contract damages at the same time. (A copy of the pertinent
pages from the Transcript are attached as Attachment "A".)
4

fixed on September 22, 1999, the date Harmer defaulted on the Note a n d informed
Machcok that he was unable to make future payments. Nothing in section 57-1-32
changes this result." (Machock's Brief, at 15.) Throughout his brief, Machock refers
to his claim as one for breach of contract. (E.g., Machock's Brief, a t 3 , 4, 13, 17, &
18.) Machock even devotes an entire section of argument to the idea that the trial
court "ruled that Machock's complaint states a valid cause of action f o r breach of
contract," even though this was not part of the trial court's holding.

(Machock's

Brief, at 18.) In any event, this Court should accord no deference to t h e trial court's
ruling under the standard of review on appeal.
Because he failed to file a deficiency claim under section 57-1-32 within three
months after the foreclosure sale, Machock's claims against Fink a r e barred. Surety
Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah 1995).
B.

Machock's Contract Claim is Barred.

Machock argues that section 57-1-32 "simply provides the m e a n s " whereby he
can "pursue his breach of contract claim against Fink." (Machock's Brief, at 15.)
This misunderstands what section 57-1-32 allows. Section 57-1-32 does not enable a
contract claim. Instead, it prohibits recovery of damages for breacH of contract. In
4

Machock accuses Fink of "ignoring] the trial court's Ruling that Machock's
Complaint states a valid cause of action." (Machock's Brief, at 1 9 0 The trial court
never made such a ruling. While the trial court held that the guaranty was "absolute,"
it never held that Machock had "a valid cause of action" following t h e foreclosure
sale. Rather, the trial court found Machock's contract claim had to b e modified by the
requirements of section 57-1-32. (R. 501-02). The trial court rejeoted Machock's
claim that section 57-1-32 is irrelevant because the guaranty is absolute, saying:
"None of this matters in light of the very broad, very expansive r e a d i n g given to
[section 57-1-32] by the Utah Supreme Court." (R. 501.)
5

Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985), the lender attempted to pursue a breach of
contact claim to recover the balance due on the obligation for which t h e trust deed
was given as security. The trial court dismissed the lender's claim, and the Supreme
Court affirmed, explaining:
[Sjection 57-1-32 provides the exclusive procedure for
securing a deficiency judgment following a trustee's sale
of the real property under a trust deed. Plaintiffs' election
to sell the property to satisfy the debt precludes them from
seeking any other remedy, including damages for breach
of contract, which might have been available to them.
Id. at 1208 (emphasis added). This principle was reaffirmed in Concepts, Inc. v. First
Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1987) ("Once a trust deed
sale has been made, that remedy [filing an action for a deficiency under section 57-132] is the exclusive remedy under statute. . . . [The lender's] failure t o bring a
deficiency action within three months after the sale of the property terminated all of
[the borrower's] remaining obligations"), and in G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v.
Durbano, 782 P.2d 962, 963-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("if the beneficiary of a trust
deed elects to foreclose nonjudicially, is owed a deficiency following application of
the sale proceeds, and wishes to obtain a deficiency judgment, an action for that
purpose must be commenced by the beneficiary under that trust deed within three
months of sale or any claim to a deficiency is waived").
Machock tries to distinguish these cases by arguing that they d o not apply
because they did not involve "a separate claim for liability on an absolute guaranty
that was filed prior to the foreclosure." (Machock's Brief, at 23.) None of those

6

cases, however, held that the timing of the filing of his contract claim made any
difference. As argued in more detail in Point II.C, below, the policies underlying the
Cox and Concepts opinions apply regardless of the timing of the filing of the lender's
claim on the guaranty. Whether or not the lender has previously sued on the guaranty,
once he elects to hold a trustee's sale, he is foreclosed from pursuing his breach o f
contract claim or any remedy other than a deficiency claim under section 57-1-32. To
pursue a deficiency action, the lender must file a complaint within t h r e e months of the
trustee's sale, and this complaint must "set forth the entire amount o f the indebtedness
which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold,
and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale." Utah Code A n n . § 57-1-32
(2000). See also Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1995). A lender
who elects to pursue a breach of contract claim instead of filing a complaint for
deficiency under section 57-1-32, is barred from pursuing any claim at all.
Characterizing Fink's guaranty as "absolute," Machock argues that he is not
subject to the requirements of section 57-1-32. He says that a section 57-1-32
deficiency action is some "other remed[y]" that he is "not required t o pursue."
(Machock's Brief, at 18.) Machock cites two cases, neither of which supports his
argument. First, Machock cites to Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way Concrete
Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This case involved a note and an
absolute guaranty that was secured by personal property, namely, construction
equipment and a truck. Id at 106. Since there was no real property at issue in Valley
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Bank, section 57-1-32 had no application to the case and was not addressed by the
court. Valley Bank has no application to this appeal.
Second, Machock cites to In re SLC Ltd. V, 152 B.R. 755 (D. Utah 1993).
Machock argues that the holding in this case "demonstrates the soundness of the trial
court's Ruling." (Machock's Brief, at 19.) In SLC Ltd., a bankruptcy court reasoned
that the protections of section 57-1-32 and Utah's One Action Rule, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-37-1, do not apply to guarantors. Id at 771. This case might support Machock's
argument, except that two years later the Supreme Court considered this issue and
reached a different result. In Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 (Utah 1995),
the Supreme Court held that guarantors are entitled to the protections of section 57-132. (See the discussion of Surety Life, below, Point II.) The doctrine of stare decisis
requires this Court to follow the decision in Surety Life, not the opinion of the
bankruptcy court in SLC Ltd. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, 399 & n.3 (Utah
1994).
Section 57-1-32, as interpreted and applied by Cox, Concepts, Adams, and
Surety Life, is Machock's exclusive remedy. Section 57-1-32 does not allow
Machock to pursue his contract claim in any form, regardless of the timing of the
filing of his claim on the guaranty.
II.

SECTION 57-1-32 APPLIES TO THE
LENDER/GUARANTOR RELATIONSHIP.

Machock ignores the plain holding of Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1
(Utah 1995), when he contends that section 57-1-32 does not apply to him.
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(Machock's Brief, at 20 ("Section 57-1-32 does not address the situation between
Machock and Fink.").) Machock suggests two reasons why he believes section 57-132 should not apply to him. First, he says: "Nothing in section 57-1-32 address the
contractual arrangement between Machock and Fink." (Machock's Brief, at 16; see
also id. at 20 ("Nowhere does section 57-1-32 purport to address the rights and
obligations of Fink's Guarantee.")) Second, he contends that section 57-1-32 does not
bar a "prior filed Complaint asserting a valid cause of action on a guaranty of
payment." (Machock's Brief, page 16; see also page 20). Surety L i f e disposes of
each of these arguments.
A.

The Facts of Surety Life Are Materially
Indistinguishable from the Facts of this
Case.

In Surety Life, there was a lender, a borrower, and several guarantors. The
lender was secured by a trust deed. The guarantors had signed separate, personal
guaranty agreements. 892 P.2d at 2. When the borrower fell into default, the lender
sold the real property at trustee's sale and acquired title to the property for a credit bid
of $1,536,000. Id At the time of the sale, the undisputed fair marlcet value of the
property was $ 1,860,000, and the unpaid balance due on the promissory note was
$ 1,839,000. Id Despite the fact that the fair market value of the property exceeded
the amount owed under the note, the lender sued the guarantors on their guaranties
seeking to recover $303,000, i ^ , the difference between the lender - 's credit bid and
the amount owed on the note and guaranties. Id.
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What the lender sought to recover in Surety Life would have resulted in a
windfall. Under the lender's theory, it would have the real property (worth more than
the indebtedness)/?/^ an additional $303,000. Machock filed this contract claim
hoping to do the same thing that the lender in Surety Life tried to do. The fact that
Machock filed his suit against Fink before he foreclosed the trust deed makes no
difference to the anaylsis under the rule of Surety Life.
B.

Surety Life Holds that a Guarantor (Like
Fink) is entitled to the Protections of
Section 57-1-32.

Machock argues that his contract claim is "independent of any deficiency
claim." (Machock's Brief, at 18.) He argues that Harmer's note and Fink's guaranty
are separate contracts. (Machock's Brief, at 21.) This argument was advanced by the
lender in Surety Life, and rejected. The Court said that this was a distinction that "has
no relevance under section 57-1-32." IcL at 3. The Court saw that section 57-1-32
"does not concern itself with which contract or instrument the action is founded on,"
but rather it applies to any action "'to recover the balance due upon t h e obligation for
which the trust deed was given as security.'" Id. quoting section 57-1-32. The lender
in Surety Life was subject to the restrictions of section 57-1-32.
C.

It Makes No Difference that Machock
Filed his Breach of Contract Claim
Before the Trustee's Sale.

Machock argues - without offering any supporting authority — that section 571-32 should not apply to him because it does not "address the effect o f a prior filed
lawsuit based on an obligation represented by a guaranty of payment." (Machock's
10

Brief, at 20.) He argues that Surety Life is "inapposite" because his complaint was
filed before the foreclosure and four months before the sale. (Machock's Brief, at
24.) Machock's argument that the timing of the filing of his contract claim makes all
the difference has no merit.
Machock filed this breach of contract lawsuit contemporaneous with the
commencement of foreclosure proceedings. (Machock's Brief, at 4 , ^flf 1 &2; R. 46566.) By failing to file a deficiency claim within three months after t h e foreclosure,
Machock elected to disregard section 57-1-32. Machock must live w i t h the choice he
made. The trial court erred when it sua sponte changed Machock's complaint into a
section 57-1-32 deficiency claim. A court cannot create or imply t h e existence of
pleadings where there are none.
Pursuing both extra-judicial foreclosure and a contract claim at the same time
generates a potentially lucrative windfall for the lender. The purpose of section 57-132 is to protect the borrower and the guarantor from losing the property and still
having to pay the entire contract indebtedness. In Surety Life, the C o u r t explained:
Because the Act [the Utah Trust Deed Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-19 to -36] does not provide the borrower with
any right of redemption, it protects the borrower by
another means: if the lender purchases the trust deed
property in a nonjudicial foreclosure at less than its f a i r
market value and then uses the Act to collect a deficiency,
the lender must credit the fair market value of the property
Machock's invocation of Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not
save him. (Machock's Brief, at 32 n.8.) This rule only applies w h e n an issue not pled
is "tried by express or implied consent of the parties." As demonstrated by Fink's
motion for summary judgment and this appeal, Fink will not consent to try a
deficiency claim that was never pled.
11

against the borrower's debt. Id § 57-1-32. In short, the
Act prevents trust deed lenders from obtaining excessive
recoveries. In addition to the fair market value offset
requirements, the Act has a three-month statute of
limitations.
Id. at 2. The filing of a contract claim before the trustee's sale is an attempt to avoid
this protection. This is especially true for a lender like Machock who filed his
contract claim at nearly the exact same time that he commenced foreclosure
proceedings. (Machock's Brief, at 4,ffif1 & 2; R. 465-66.) Creating a before- and
after-foreclosure distinction encourages lenders to do what Machock did: disregard
the pleading and filing requirements of section 57-1-32 by filing a contract claim
before the sale. If the Court creates this before-and-after distinction, a lender will
have no reason to comply with section 57-1-32, or file a deficiency claim at all. He
will simply file a contract claim before the sale for the purpose of skirting the
limitations imposed by section 57-1-32. The best way to prevent this kind of tactic is
to require compliance with section 57-1-32 regardless of whether the lender had filed
a contract claim prior to the sale. If a prior complaint has been filed, a lender must
file a new complaint or amend the existing complaint within the three-month period
required by section 57-1-32. That pleading must include all of the facts required by
the statute, such as the amount for which the property was sold and the fair market
value at the date of sale. The Legislature has already mandated this requirement
without distinguishing whether a prior complaint for breach of contract has already
been filed. This Court should not judicially impose that kind of distinction on the
statute. This is precisely what the trial court did in the present case when it allowed
12

Machock to go forward with his contract claim "subject to" section 57-1-32 because
Machock had previously sued Fink on the guaranty.
Machock chose the same course as the lender in Surety Life. I n Surety Life the
lender did not bring a deficiency action, opting instead to sue for the balance due on
the note and guaranty. 892 P.2d 2. In light of this election, the Court held that the
lender was prohibited from proceeding on his contract claim, and it w a s not allowed
to commence a deficiency claim because more than three months h a d passed since the
trustee's sale. IcL at 3. In the present case, the trial court created an exception to
Surety Life, allowing Machock to go forward with his contract claim "subject t o " the
damages limitations provided in section 57-1-32. Machock wants t h i s Court to
affirm. (Machock's Brief, at 15 & 24 n.5.) The Court in Surety Life did not permit
the lender to pursue his contract claim, and this Court should follow that result.
III.

KIRKBRIDE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS
CASE.

The trial court should have applied Surety Life and dismissed Machock's
contract claim. Instead, the trial court sua sponte transformed Macliock's contract
claim into a section 57-1-32 deficiency claim. The trial court did triis based on an
ereoneous interpretation of Standard Federal Savings & Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d
1136 (Utah 1991). Misapprehending Kirkbride, the trial court reasoned that the
statutory filing and pleading requirements of section 57-1-32 are " a mere procedural
hurdle" (R. 502) that is satisfied "when 'notice' is given to the debtor." (R. 503).
This was not the holding of Kirkbride.

13

In Kirkbride, unlike in this case, the lender filed a timely deficiency action
within the three-month limitations period. When the borrowers discovered that the
complaint had not been served within 120 days, they moved to dismiss for failure to
serve under Rule 4(b), and the trial court granted the motion dismissing the complaint
without prejudice. The lender then re-filed the complaint. Whereupon, the borrowers
moved to dismiss again, arguing that the second complaint was barred b y section 571-32's three-month statute of limitations. Id. at 1137. The lender o p p o s e d dismissal
arguing that it should be allowed to proceed under the savings statute (Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-40) because the second complaint was filed less than o n e year following
dismissal of the first complaint. Id. The trial agreed to let the second lawsuit
proceed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the savings statute and affirmed.
Analyzing the interplay between the two statutes, the Court held that t h e savings
statute could b e applied to a section 57-1-32 deficiency claim. I d at 1138. The Court
allowed the second lawsuit to proceed because the lender had satisfied section 57-132's three-month limitation by timely filing the first lawsuit. I d ; see also, C.P. v.
Utah Office of Crime Victims' Reparations, 966 P.2d 1226, 1228-29 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (same).
The salient fact of Kirkbride is that the lender filed the first deficiency action
within the three-month limitations period. The reason the first action did not proceed
to a decision on the merits was because of a procedural failing: the summons had not
been served in a timely manner. The Court explained that "57-1-32 d o e s not
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permanently bar further proceedings any time some procedural failing results in the
dismissal of a, properly filed action." The primary purpose of that section is satisfied,
held the Court, when "the foreclosing party provides notice to the debt that a
deficiency will be sought by filing the action" 821 P.2d at 1138.
Machock is not the victim of some "procedural failing" - like n o t serving the
second complaint within 120 days - because (unlike the lender in Kirkbride) he never
filed &firstcomplaint that invoked section 57-1-32 in the first place, and, to date, he
has never asserted a claim for deficiency in any form.
Citing to Kirkbride, Machock defends the trial court's ruling b y arguing that
"the three-month limitation period of section 57-1-32 is a mere procedural hurdle."
(Machock's Brief, at 25.) This was not the holding in Kirkbride. S u c h an exception
swallows the rule. If the actual commencement of a lawsuit by filing a complaint is
now just a "procedural hurdle," then this and all statutes of limitation are meaningless.
To reach this conclusion this Court would have to distort Kirkbride a n d all other cases
applying statutes of limitations.
In Fink's opening brief, he pointed out that such a rule would encourage noncompliance with section 57-1-32's strict pleading and filing requirements, and for
litigants in general it would introduce an unstructured "notice" procedure. Kirkbride
should not be interpreted to allow such a result.
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IV.

MACHOCK IS NOT ALLOWED TO PURSUE
A DEFICIENCY BECAUSE HE DID NOT
COMMENCE A LAWSUIT TO DO SO.
A.

A Plaintiff Commences a Lawsuit by
Filing a Complaint.

Section 57-1-32 requires every lender who wishes to pursue a deficiency to
"commence" a lawsuit for that purpose, and the complaint must "set forth the entire
amount of the indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for
which such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale."
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2000). Few statutes have such precise pleading
requirements.
Machock argues that these filing and pleading requirements are "tedious and
inefficient," "unnecessary," "a waste of time," and do "not further the purpose of the
statute." (Machock's Brief, at 16-17.) In their place he advocates extra-judicial
"notice." (IcL at 16.) He says that by giving "notice" by means other than the filing
of a complaint he "eliminat[ed] the need" to file a second lawsuit or amend his
original complaint.

(Id at 17.) This argument conflicts with the plain language of

section 57-1-32 and the cases interpreting that statute. Under the statute, notice of a
claim for a deficiency can only be given through the filing of a complaint containing
certain necessary allegations relating to the foreclosure sale.
He has never filed a complaint that alleges the elements required by section 571-32, and he has never made a request in this lawsuit to amend his pleading so that it

16

abandons his contract claim in favor of a deficiency claim under section 57-1-32. It is
now too late for Machock to file a new complaint or amend his pleading.
B.

Machock Never Gave any "Notice" that
He Intended to Pursue a Deficiency
Action under Section 57-1-32.

The only way to give notice of a deficiency claim is by the filing of a
complaint, but even if section 57-1-32 could be satisfied by giving " n o t i c e " through
means other than the filing of a complaint, Machock has not given a n y such notice in
this case. In his brief, at 26 - 28, Machock references five documents that he says are
"examples of Machock placing Fink on notice that he would pursue a deficiency."
(Machock's Brief, at 25.) None of these satisfies section 57-1-32's f i l i n g and
pleading requirements, and none of them give "notice" that Machock will pursue a
deficiency claim:
•

Correspondence dated October 4, 1999 (R. 456-66). T h i s is a demand

letter threatening to file a complaint that ultimately became the complaint in this case.
There is no reference in this letter to section 57-1-32, or the fair mairket value as
required by section 57-1-32.
•

Machock's Complaint (R. 1-3). The complaint contains no allegations

relating to the foreclosure sale or a claim for a deficiency under section 57-1-32.
•

Correspondence dated April 18, 2000 (R. 436-37). T l i i s letter

acknowledges that Machock has completed the trustee's sale, and tliereby taken title
to the property, but it does not satisfy the pleading requirements of section 57-1-32. It
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does not state the date of the sale, the amount of the indebtedness, or t h e fair market
value as required by section 57-1-32.
•

Machock's Reply to Fink's Amended Counterclaim, d a t e d October 3 1 .

2000 (R. 247-60). In this pleading, Machock continues to assert his contract claim.
Instead of invoking section 57-1-32 and giving a credit for the fair m a r k e t value of the
property, Machock says: "this issue has been mooted by the completion of
foreclosure proceedings against the Harmer residence, which failed to yield any funds
to satisfy Machock's lien ...."

(R. at 255.) Machock eschews the v e r y purpose of

section 57-1-32: giving a credit based on the fair market value and n o t the price
yielded at the trustee's sale. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 ("The c o u r t may not
render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of t h e indebtedness
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale."); Surety Life
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1995) (the Act "protects the b o r r o w e r by"
requiring the lender to "credit the fair market value of the property a g a i n s t the
borrower's debt.").
•

Machock's Responses to Discovery, dated May 5, 2003 (not in the

Record). 6 Machock claims that his responses to interrogatories constitute notice
because they are "a pleading addressing the restrictions of section 5 7 - 1 - 3 2 . "
Fink objects to the Court's considering Machock's discovery responses,
which were not before the lower court when it granted summary j u d g m e n t . Even if
they are considered, however, they do not support Machock's claim t h a t he gave
notice to Fink. (See above, Fink's Reply to Machock's Statement of Facts, pages 1 2.)
18

(Machock's Brief, at 33.) This is flawed for several reasons. First, discovery is n o t a
"pleading." Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, Machock did not serve
his discovery responses on Fink until more than three years after the trustee's sale and
he never filed them with the lower court. Third, and most importantly, the substance
of Machock's responses do not address the restrictions of section 57-1-32 in any way.
More than anything, these discovery responses show that Fink is not pursuing a
statutory deficiency. Fink served these interrogatories after the trial court's ruling,
asking Machock to explain what he would claim as the statutory deficiency and fair
market value of the property. Remarkably, even after the trial court's ruling,
Machock continued to insist on full contract damages. When Fink a s k e d Machock to
"State the full amount that you will seek to recover from Fink at trial based on the
Note and guarantee," Machock responded that he would seek to recover the full
amount owing on the note and guaranty. (Machock's Brief, Ex. B, Response to
Interrogatory No. 1.) When Fink asked him to show how he calculated the amount
owing, Machock responded that this amount is "calculated by determining the unpaid
principal and interest owed to date pursuant to Fink's Guarantee," Avithout reference
to the fair market value as required by section 57-1-32 and the trial court's ruling.
(Machock's Brief, Ex. B, Response to Interrogatory No. 2). When Fink asked
Machock to state what he thought was the fair market value, and t o show his
calculation, Machock replied that the fair market value should be determined by the
amount that Machock bid at the foreclosure sale (which Surety L i f e held cannot be
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done. 892 P.2d at 2). (Machock's Brief, Ex. B, Response to Interrogatories No. 3, 4
&5).
Even if section 57-1-32 could be satisfied by giving "notice" through means
other than the filing of a complaint - and it cannot - Machock has not given any such
notice.
CONCLUSION
Fink requests that this Court enter an order reversing the opinion of the trial
court, and holding that Machock's breach of contract claim is barred and he cannot
proceed with a section 57-1-32 deficiency action because he never filed a pleading to
do so within the time allowed by the statute.
Dated: January £j«004

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

R. Stephen Marshall
David W. Tuffs
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)415-3000
Attorneys for Carl William ("Bill") Fink,
Appellant

[Attachment: Reply Brief on CD ROM]

20

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^ ( Q day of January, 2004,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the within and foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT CARL
WILLIAM FINK to be mailed in the U.S. Mail, first-class, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Paul D. Veasy
Angie Nelson

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Attorneys for Joseph Machock

W. Kevin Jackson, Esq.
311 South State Street, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for John Harmer

C=

KGSJ?A^JL1£IAJ

21

A

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH MACHOCK,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 990700380 DC
Appellate Case No. 20030301-CA

CARL WILLIAM (BILL) FINK,
Defendant.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING MARCH 6, 2003
BEFORE
HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN

FILED

:of!

' Judgment hearing March 6,

AUG 0 7 2003
SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

VD11198333
990700380

FINK, CARL WILLIAM (BILL)

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

PAUL D. VEASY
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main, #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For the Defendant:

DAVID W. TUFTS
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For Mr. Harmer:

W. KEVIN JACKSON
JENSEN, DUFFIN & ASSOCIATES
311 South State, #380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
* * *

Oral Arguments

Page

Mr. Tufts
Mr. Veasy
Mr. Jackson

2,32
18
29

THE COURT:

Yeah, but I'm suggesting that he does get I

a benefit.
MR. VEASY:

Okay.

THE COURT:

If he does get a benefit, isn't your

position based on the legal theory that he can sue for the full
amount on the guaranty because the guarantor has waived his
right to the collateral for the underlying loan, in this case
the Trust Deed?
MR. VEASY:

Are you asking?

THE COURT:

I'm asking you.

MR. VEASY:

Well, I-

THE COURT:

Because if that's the case, clearly
!

there's a windfall and if in indeed that windfall exists, then i
I
i
how does that square with the Surety Life against Smith case?
MR. VEASY:

Different causes of action.

One is on a !
i

i

guarantee which the guarantor signed waiving the rights to the j
collateral.

Besides that, under the Valley Bank case, his debt
i

i

is fixed when Mr. Harmer stops making payments on the note.
THE COURT:

'

But you would agree, if in deed on the

foreclosure sale of the Trust Deed, that's the collateral for
the loan.

|

Then you've got this unconditional guarantee, if the

lender foreclosures on the Trust Deed and the guarantor doesn't
protect his right of subrogation, that the lender can take the
value of the property, let's assume it has a value, and also
collect full price under the guarantee at the time suit was
26

filed.
MR. VEASY:

If the guarantor gets the property, he

1
i

also has the ability to assign his rights over, whether it's

!
1
j

subrogation or otherwise to the guarantor.
THE COURT:
property.

But the guarantor isn't getting the

I

The property is going to the lender which is

foreclosed.
MR. VEASY:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

And there's value in that property.

Now

you're saying that the lender who has taken the underlying
collateral, can now sue the guarantor for the full amount of

j

the loan.

]

MR. VEASY:

If the guarantor doesn't protect his

THE COURT:

I understand where you're coming from.

MR. VEASY:

Okay.

position.

Now, on the second issue, again,

with respect to the argument that Mr. Fink was released from
his obligations because of a settlement that went on between
Mr. Harmer and Mr. Machock, again, the guarantee is an
independent contractual right.

Nothing precludes Mr. Harmer

and Mr. Machock from reaching a resolution on their claim.

The

guarantee is a separate contractual obligation and a separate
claim.

What happens in this one situation is fine, you cannot

get a double recovery in a windfall because if Mr. Harmer
totally pays down the debt, the guarantor can't get it twice
27

1

the windfall but the simple fact that as long as that debt is

2

outstanding because of the guarantee of payment, Mr. Fink is on

3

the hook for that amount when Mr. Harmer stops making payment.

4

THE COURT:

5

When I asked the question to Mr. Tufts

about the notice and that sort of thing, I applied it to the

6 j Surety Life Insurance and then applying the formula for 57-1-32 [
7

to the measure of damages, he said that's something that your

8

client is not even asking for or looking at and I take it

9

that's true, that your position is it's simply a separate

10 j contract and therefore your client has a right to sue on that
11

contract and that the release is something that doesn't apply

12

for the reasons that you've indicated and the motion should be J

13

j

•.

denied and you should be able to proceed then based on the
\

i

!

14 j guarantee and collect the full amount?
15 j

MR. VEASY:

Yes, sir.

16 I

THE COURT:

All right.

17 !

MR. VEASY:

And if I may add, and I'll finish up

19 '

THE COURT:

All right.

20 ;

MR. VEASY:

The first argument that the code section

18 , here.

i

21 | applies with an existing lawsuit having been filed on a
22

contractual claim is nonsensical.

It flat out is nonsensical

23 : because what we were saying is, well, then any lawsuit that is
24

commenced by a guarantor, whether or not a foreclosure has been

25

commenced that the guarantor under a guarantee of payment is
28

